Signals in the noise: Institutional changes in DoD human performance
I’ve been in the human performance world long enough to know when something is just another program update, and when it’s actually pointing toward a bigger shift. Right now, across the DoD, we’re seeing signs of real change and, in my opinion, it reflects an authentic inflection point in human performance. The Marine Corps’ announcement of the 2025 Human Performance Advisory Council, the updated Marine Corps Physical Fitness doctrine, and the Army’s decision to remove the standing power throw from their physical fitness test aren’t just random updates — they’re connected. And they’re telling us something: The DoD continues to take human performance seriously as a capability, not just a compliance metric. This matters — because over the last few decades, the science, the tools, and the real-world demands on tactical communities have dramatically evolved. We have access to better data, better tech, and a much clearer picture of what drives durability, recovery, and performance under stress. But none of that matters if it doesn’t show up where it counts: in how we assess, how we train, how we lead, and how we equip people to deliver fitness and readiness, especially when the job title on their chest isn’t “strength coach.” Signal #1 – The Marine Corps HPAC: Elevating performance from program to priority The Marine Corps stood up the HPAC for a reason. It’s not just another meeting or working group, it’s a signal that human performance is being elevated from a set of supporting programs to something more strategic. By pulling in decision-makers from across commands to align efforts in fitness, nutrition, sleep, recovery, and tech integration, the Corps is building the scaffolding for actionable, sustained progress. That matters. In a space that can become siloed or chaotically decentralized, this kind of structure gives room for coordination and clarity. It creates the potential for cross-domain alignment, not just across PT and injury prevention, but across an entire ecosystem that affects readiness and lethality. To me, it also shows that leadership continues to recognize what many of us in the field have been saying for years: Human performance can’t live off to the side. It must be baked into how we plan, how we prioritize, and how we lead. HPAC gives the Marine Corps a platform to do exactly that. Signal #2 – MCRP 7-20C.1: A doctrine-level shift toward real capability The release of the updated Marine Corps Physical Fitness publication MCRP 7-20C.1 might not grab headlines, but it’s a big deal. It marks a clear shift in how the Marine Corps is defining and supporting physical readiness. This isn’t just a rehash of training guidelines — it reads more as a comprehensive, systems-aware document that connects the dots between physiology, programming, instruction, and long-term capability. What stands out is how it integrates performance science with practical application. There are references to VO₂ max, lactate threshold, muscle fiber types, foundational movement patterns (which I had a hand in developing), neuromotor training, and recovery strategies – the kind of concepts that used to be reserved for sports science journals, not military doctrine. But here, they’re laid out in a way that’s accessible and meant to be used. Even more important is the recognition that training doesn’t happen in a vacuum. The manual calls out sleep, nutrition, injury prevention, stress, and environment as key performance drivers. The Marine Corps is looking beyond test day and taking seriously the systems and conditions that shape a Marine’s ability to show up, hold up, and recover fast. For those of us involved in training, program development, or designing equipment and environments, this kind of doctrinal clarity is huge. It opens the door for better alignment between what’s written, what’s resourced, and what’s actually possible on the ground. Signal #3 – The ACFT adjustment: A willingness to adapt when it matters The Army’s decision to remove the standing power throw from the Army Combat Fitness Test – which will be renamed the Army Fitness Test by June – may raise eyebrows, including mine, but it also sends a message: leaders are willing to listen, adjust, and refine when the data or operational realities call for it. This kind of move isn’t about lowering the bar. It’s about taking actions to make sure we’re testing what actually matters and making room for smarter programming and better instruction. The standing power throw wasn’t a bad test. It had a purpose: assessing explosive power. But it came with some baggage. High variability, coaching inconsistencies, and limited carryover to day-to-day training may have made it hard to implement cleanly across the force. Rather than cling to it just because it was “new,” the Army made the call to step back and reassess. I respect that. To me, that’s progress. This is what institutional learning looks like. Not everything we try is going to be perfect out of the gate. But the willingness to revisit decisions, adjust based on real-world feedback, and prioritize relevance over rigidity? That’s a sign of maturity. It opens the door for bigger conversations about how we assess readiness, not just through a single event, but through patterns of performance that authentically reflect what warfighters need to develop and sustain over a career. Legacy Model Emerging Model Fitness as compliance Fitness as a strategic capability Tests determine readiness Capability defines readiness Siloed domains Integrated HP systems Prescriptive templates Adaptive, evidence-informed design Closing thoughts These three moves – the creation of HPAC, the release of MCRP 7-20C.1, and the Army’s decision to refine the AFT – represent more than isolated updates. They appear to be part of a broader shift that’s overdue and headed in the right direction. We’re starting to see performance treated as a system, not a silo; as a strategic capability, not an afterthought. Readiness is being reframed around capability, not just compliance. And across the services, leaders are taking steps to build more durable, adaptable warfighters over the long haul. There’s still work to do. Implementation, coaching, infrastructure, and delivery still may lag behind policy and science. But the foundation